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Abstract 
As the business environment become more uncertain and competitive, many organizations are seeking ways to gain economic 
efficiency and share in business and technology risk. Despite wide differences in the reference disciplines applied to outsourcing 
research, the vast majority of it assumes a one-to-one relationship between the client and the outsourcing vendor. This paper 
examines the economic, strategic, and organizational issues involved in IT outsourcing when more complex arrangements are 
considered - such as multi-vendor alliances, co-sourcing, and complex multi-vendor, multi-client relationships. In this paper, we 
identzJji a taxonomy of four classes of outsourcing relationships (based on how many clients and vendors are involved in the 
outsourcing relationshipl, and illustrate each with recent business examples. Grounded in this taxonomy, we develop a theoretical 
framework that identfies both enabling and constraining forces that may influence client firms in choosing among the four types of 
outsourcing relationships. This paper provides insights regarding how the variations in the nature of these outsourcing relationships 
muy shape the benefits and risks be achieved porn outsourcing, as well as the ongoing complexity of managing outsourcing 
relationships. 
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1. Introduction 
While still a relatively recent phenomenon, IT outsourcing has evolved through several phases and the literature has adopted a 
variety of theoretical lenses to explain the phenomenon. The majority of studies on IT outsourcing presume that client firms seeking 
IT services act independently of each other, while IT vendors do the same. Thus the assumed relationship between client firm and IT 
vendor has been a simple "dyadic" one. Despite the emergence of new terminology to describe different characteristics of these 
relationships such as a long-term strategic alliances, partnership, rather than simple market-based contracts (Fitzgerald & Willcocks, 
1994), the fact is that concepts such as alliance or partnership have been little used to describe the relationships that may exist among 
client firms seeking IT services or among IT vendors themselves. As we discuss below, we believe that terms such as "partnership" 
or "strategic alliance" have only been used to characterize simple, dyadic outsourcing relationships between a single client and IS 
vendor. Furthermore, these terms are heavily used today and have recently been shown to be abused (Marcolin & McLennan, 1998) 
by using them to describe IS relationships which have no true partnership characteristics, such as risk sharing (Aubert, Patry & 
Rivard, 1998). 
Two recent shifts in the business world prompt the need to develop a more comprehensive vocabulary and framework for 
understanding IS outsourcing relationships. The first is the observed shift toward more complex outsourcing arrangements, defined 
here as relationships involving more than two parties. According to an InformationWeek survey of IT managers (Caldwell, 1998), 
92% of firms were using multiple IT vendors to assist them with their work; only 8% were using just a single IT vendor. One 
example is the recent announcement by Bell South Telecommunications that it had entered into a ten-year outsourcing arrangement 
with Andersen Consulting and EDS to provide application development, operations support, network planning, and administration 
(Gamer, 1998). 
The second shift is the greater frequency of cooperative arrangements among client or vendor firms. This includes such 
arrangements as joint ventures, strategic marketing alliances, and mergers and acquisitions. W i l e  the strategic management and R&D 
literature has paid increasing attention to the role of such networks in enabling firms to achieve their objectives, the IT literature has 
minimized the importance of such collaborative arrangements (with few exceptions, such as Cross, 1995). Increasingly, however, 
more complex or collaborative relationships are necessary - involving multiple IS vendors working in concert with each other, and 
possibly working to serve multiple clients under the terms of the same contract or same relationship. We believe that such 
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collaborative relationships - which we will characterize below as multi-vendor, co-sourcing, and complex IS outsourcing relationships 
- are increasingly necessary as client firms prefer to develop solutions characterized by "best of breed expertise, rather than reliance 
on a single, comprehensive vendor solution. In addition, the need to develop common infrastructures across multi-divisional firms or 
even across entire industries generates the need for incorporating many players (or actors) into the game. 
This paper develops a framework for integrating recent insights in strategic management with current thinking regarding IT 
outsourcing. We develop and present a theoretical framework describing different classes of outsourcing relationships, and analyze 
why client firms seeking IT services may wish to consider more collaborative or complex outsourcing arrangements than the dyadic 
relationships that have often been described in the IT literature. This framework draws from prior theoretical traditions that have been 
used to analyze IT outsourcing behavior -- specifically transaction cost economics, agency theory, conventional economic theory, and 
combines them with recent insights from cooperation theory (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992). This paper does not test propositions 
derived from any one of these theoretical traditions; rather, it combines them in a novel way, in order to generate new insights into the 
benefits and risks to be obtained from an array of outsourcing relationships that transcend the simple, dyadic relationships. 
2. Literature Review 
This section reviews the IT outsourcing literature as well as relevant literature from fields such as economics, strategic 
management, and R&D that are relevant to outsourcing alliances among client firms and IT vendors. The early IT outsourcing 
literature has employed transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975; Alchian & Demsetz, 1972) as the primary theoretical lens to 
examine IS outsourcing arrangements (Loh & Venkatraman, 1992a). For example, Gurbaxani & Whang (1991) have suggested that 
firms should perform specific business functions in-house only if the transaction costs associated with arranging for such services in 
the marketplace exceed the production cost savings to be achieved from outsourcing it. The transaction cost economics approach thus 
implicitly relies on issues of economies of scale to determine whether firms should contract in the marketplace for provision of IT 
services. This received wisdom from transaction cost economics changed in the early 1990s when - at the celebrated lead of Kodak 
(Loh & Venkatraman, 1992b; Applegate & Montealegre, 1991), firms recognized that the overall production costs of managing their 
own internal IT operations may well be reduced by outsourcing - due to considerable economies of scale available to large IT 
vendors such as IBM. Within a few years, many large firms were jumping on the IT "outsourcing bandwagon" (Lacity & Hirschheim, 
1993), and the conventional wisdom for general managers now reversed to the notion that "we don't maintain our own power supply, 
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so why should we do the same for IT?" (Venkatraman & Loh, 1994). Since many general managers already perceived their IT 
spending to be a mere overhead cost (rather than an investment) this prompted them to believe that if IT services could be provided 
cheaper in the external marketplace, then "why not outsource?" Within a few years of Kodak's lead (Loh & Venkatraman, 1992b), the 
burden-of-proof shifted to internal IS management to justify why it should continue providing IT services, when economies of scale 
favored huge providers such as CSC and EDS (at least for data center management). As a result, a new industry was born in 
conducting IT benchmarking studies. 
While the focus still remained on IT costs, there was a different presumption. While IT outsourcing was assumed to be what smart 
firms do, outsourcing research now focused on how the ideal contract could be negotiated, written, and enforced (Chaudhury, Nam & 
Rao, 1995). Thus agency theory became a valuable theoretical framework to analyze the relationships between a firm and the parties 
responsible for IT services, for example, software development (Banker & Kemerer, 1992). This perspective recognized many risks 
inherent in creating and managing outsourcing contracts. 
Recently, the focus has shifted from characteristics of the ideal outsourcing contract to the practicalities of making outsourcing 
relationships work. Following several well-publicized problems of IT outsourcing failures reported in the IT press (Farrell, 1998; 
Fabris, 1997; Earl, 1996; CIO, 1996) managers realized the savvy that was required to manage these relationships. This research 
stream has identified several problems that may occur during an outsourcing relationship -- such as hidden costs, failure to implement 
new technology innovations, failure to pass on cost savings to the client, arguments regarding contract details and interpretation of 
performance metrics (Earl, 1996). This literature has focused on developing appropriate contract language and incentives to minimize 
or prevent such risks. 
Related to this, certain researchers have begun to develop a vocabulary to describe different philosophies of managing outsourcing 
relationships. Fitzgerald & Willcocks (1994) have identified two extremes as "simple transactional contracts" and the "full 
partnership-based relations" with a range of interim relationships.' Not only is each pure type of outsourcing relationship appropriate 
for a particular set of environmental and firm conditions, but recent research has built upon this framework to suggest that trust is an 
Fitzgerald & Willcocks (1994: 93) identified five types of relationships: 1) tightly-defined service contracts; 2) short flexible service contracts; 3) partnerships 
based on formal contracts; 4) flexible partnerships based on trust; and 5) strategic alliances. 
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essential pre-condition to developing such strategic alliances (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1997; Fitzgerald & Willcocks, 1994). 
Marcolin & McLellan (1998) also suggest that such variety in relationships are also rooted in other industry and organizational factors 
such as the client's business and IT objectives, the level of uncertainty in their industry, and "interpretation strictness" -- how tightly 
or loosely the actual contract is observed in day-to-day practice. 
The language of "partnership" and "strategic alliance" has recently entered the vocabulary of casual conversation regarding IS 
outsourcing -- and such terms have become broadly used whether the specifics of the situation match the actual conditions specified 
by Fitzgerald & Willcocks (1994) for partnership or not. The IT trade press unwittingly illustrates the over-use of "partnership" and 
"strategic alliance" jargon when applied to IT outsourcing (Caldwell, 1988; Hellebust, 1988).2 Academic research has drawn the same 
conclusion. For example, one recent study on outsourcing relationships among banks and their IT vendors described that (Marcolin & 
McLellan, 1998: 656): 
... five of the six banks stated that they had a strategic partnership .... [but] regardless of the stated relationships, only three actually 
exhibited behaviors to support the strategic partnership label.. .. [Two others] ofien resorted to the contractual details to resolve problems 
without concern for reciprocal outcomes. 
The language of partnerships and strategic alliance should not be taken lightly, since such labels create expectations for how client 
firms and IT vendors should behave, which may be difficult to meet. Nevertheless, these concepts bear further examination, because 
it is not only clients and IT vendor firms that may enter into long-term partnerships; vendors and firms may themselves select such 
arrangements. We believe there is a need to develop a comprehensive framework for describing and understanding more complex 
outsourcing relationships, such as multi-vendor andlor multi-client alliances. Both multi-vendor and co-sourcing arrangements are 
now increasingly common, as we demonstrate below. 
* Fitzgerald & Willcocks (1994) identified seven attributes which can lead to effective partner relationships: non-reliance on the contract as the basis of the 
relatio&hip;a mutual desire to work things out and a give-and-takephilosophy; the ability to work together in personal relationshipsterms; existence of a cultural fit 
between the client and vendororganizations;good treatment of the client's transferredstaR a perceptionthat the vendor understands the client's business and problems; 
. - 
a fair profit for the vendor ... [to prevent against] an inadequatecontract. 
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Table 1 identifies several recent multi-vendor outsourcing arrangements. While such multi-vendor arrangements have occurred for 
many years,3 the nature of the multi-vendor relationship has been overlooked or downplayed. Perhaps this was because many initial 
outsourcing "mega-deals" called for total outsourcing to a single vendor (Venkatraman & Loh, 1992a; Huber, 1993). Greater 
recognition has recently been accorded to such multi-vendor deals. Perhaps this is due to the greater propensity of firms to engage in 
selective outsourcing (Lacity, Willcocks & Feeny, 1996), "smart sourcing" (Earl, 1996) or "functional outsourcing" (Grover, Cheon, 
& Teng, 1996). Client firms thus recognize the need to engage multiple vendors to manage all of their outsourcing needs. 
The greater frequency of such multi-vendor outsourcing arrangements may be due to a variety of forces. For example, IT vendors 
may be changing their business strategies to focus on their own core competencies. By teaming with other IT vendors whose core 
competencies complement their own, IT vendors may be best able to provide comprehensive IT services to their clients. Conversely, 
client firms (those contracting for outsourcing services) may deliberately set a strategy of having their IT needs serviced by multiple 
vendors (Cross, 1995), and they may choose to make explicit in their contracts that multiple vendors actively cooperative in serving 
them. There are other potential reasons why the frequency and visibility of such multi-vendor arrangements are increasing, although 
given the paucity of research in this area, such speculation will be deferred until the paper's discussion. Whatever the underlying 
reasons for the greater frequency of multi-vendor outsourcing arrangements, they are now a common part of the outsourcing 
landscape, and firms who consider outsourcing should evaluate the additional benefits, risks, and daily challenges posed by such 
opportunities. 
It is important to recognize that complex outsourcing arrangements may involve multiple client firms, as well as vendor firms. 
Client firms are themselves forming into alliances for the purpose of having greater buying power when developing new custom 
applications (Shanna & Yetton, 1996), or in establishing IT standards and creating infrastructure which will support future 
transactions (Choudhury, 1997). While the IT literature has generally neglected the use of alliances and business n e t ~ o r k s , ~  this topic 
has been of considerable interest to scholars from the strategic management and R&D communities. Research has shown that such 
alliances have been widely adopted in the biotechnology, pharmaceutical, and electronic and computer components industries (Kogut, 
Shan, & Walker, 1992; Tucci, 1998; Nohria & Eccles, 1992). Consistent with economic research showing that alliances are most 
Kodak's 1989 outsourcing contract called for contracts with three outsourcing vendors - IBM, DEC and Businessland (Applegate & Montealegre, 1991). 
With the exception of research analyzing the notion of alliance between IT vendors and firms, (Fitzgerald & Willcocks, 1994; Marcolin & McLennan, I998), as 
described above. 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-98-24 
common in fast-growing, high-technology industries (Mariti & Smiley, 1983) such arrangements are an important way for firms to 
ascend a learning curve where product generations change quickly and time-to-market is critical. Jarillo (1988) has noted two types 
of alliances in the strategy literature: recurrent contracting and relational contracting. While similar in terms of the ongoing nature of 
the business relationship, recurrent contracting is essentially a repeated set of market transactions whereas relational contracting is a 
true alliance. The latter has a longer time frame and is grounded in trust between the parties. Other researchers have labeled such 
relational contracts as "value-adding partnerships" (Johnston, & Lawrence, 1988), "information partnerships" (Konsynski & 
McFarlan, 1990), and "hybrid market arrangements" (Malone, Yates, & Benjamin, 1988). 
We propose the framework in Figure 1 as an analytic device for developing appropriate terminology and identieing distinctions 
between different types of IT outsourcing arrangements. While the majority of the IT outsourcing arrangements that have typically 
been analyzed in the literature have focused on simple, dyadic outsourcing arrangements (one client, one vendor), the framework 
distinguishes among three classes of multi-party arrangements: multi-vendor (one client, multiple vendors), co-sourcing (many 
clients, one vendor), and complex outsourcing (many clients, many vendors). This paper defines each class of outsourcing relationship 
and analyzes reasons why client firms may pursue outsourcing arrangements other than simple, dyadic relationships. 
This paper will address several questions. These questions all presume the existence of a business firm ("the client") that desires to 
outsource some IT activities. 
Why may a client firm choose to work with one or more IT vendors? 
Why may client firms band together to purchase services jointly from an IT vendor? 
Under what circumstances do multiple IT vendors collaborate for providing IT services to a client firm? 
What triggers such multi-vendor collaborations? 
Through elaboration of the theoretical framework in Figure 1, we identify enabling and constraining forces that may influence a 
client finn to choose certain outsourcing arrangements. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We first briefly define 
It is not our objective to identify whether a firm should outsource IT activities or, if it chooses to do so, which IT activities should be outsourced. Although 
interesting questions, these have been discussed and debated at considerable length in the IT literature. 
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each cell of the matrix, and offer descriptions of current outsourcing examples. With this taxonomy in mind, we analyze the forces 
that may enable or constrain firms from adopting outsourcing arrangements other than simple dyadic ones. We first consider the case 
of multi-vendor relationships, analyzing enabling and constraining forces that may encourage or prevent firms from seeking such 
relationships. Second, we consider the case of co-sourcing arrangements, similarly identifying both enabling and constraining forces. 
Since the last class of relationships -- complex multi-vendor, multi-client relationships are a special case of both co-sourcing and 
multi-vendor alliances combined, we reserve some brief comments for the additional complexities created by these arrangements. 
3. Theoretical Framework 
Cell 1: Simple outsourcing Relationships 
(One Client, One Vendor) 
A one-to-one relationship is straightforward, and has been assumed in most outsourcing research. The client relies on a single 
outsourcing vendor in satisfying all of its outsourcing needs, which might range from a simple (i.e. accounts payable system) to a 
more sophisticate task (i.e. ERF' Implementation skills). Most previous academic studies in IT outsourcing, particularly those that 
examined the contractual risks from the transaction costs economics perspective, have treated this one-to-one relationship as the 
default. One reason for this bias has been that for the last several decades there have been only a few IT outsourcing vendors (EDS, 
IBM and Andersen Consulting) dominating the market.6 These huge vendors have been equipped with both the advantages of market 
power and knowledge expertise, thus enabling them to provide their clients with a full menu of IT services7 Such dominance by a 
few huge firms has made it difficult for smaller vendors to compete; the latter often focus on specific industries (e.g., health care) or 
in specialized technology niches (e.g., web page design). More important, these smaller vendors had little opportunity to cooperate 
with the large outsourcing providers. Examples of simple dyadic outsourcing relationships abound. Continental Bank's celebrated 
case of outsourcing to EDS and General Dynamics' outsourcing to CSC are prototypical examples (Huber, 1994; Venkatraman & 
Loh, 1992a). 
Cell 2: Multi-Vendor Relationships 
These three vendors -- EDS, IBM and Andersen Consulting had a combined 75% market share in 1990. 
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(One Client, Many Vendors) 
A one-to-many relationship indicates that one client uses multiple outsourcing vendors to achieve its objectives, and that division- 
of-labor is jointly negotiated and understood by all parties to the agreement. For instance, in 1989 Kodak fully leveraged the expertise 
of three outsourcing companies (IBM, Digital Equipment Corporation and Business Land) by allowing them to concentrate on their 
core IT services. In 1994, British Petroleum's Exploration division entered into a similar arrangement with three IT vendors to 
provide services in data center management, application development, and network installation and support (Cross, 1995). Recently, 
Chevron's IT division signed a deal, valued at about $450 million, with three outsourcing companies (EDS, GTE, and Sprint) to make 
a best use of each firm's specialty (EDS Press Release, 1998. Table 1 provides several very recent examples of firms entering into 
multi-vendor outsourcing relationships. In most cases, such a multi-vendor alliance places a heavy coordination burden on each 
member, as discussed below. 
Cell 3: Co-Sourcing Relationships 
(Many-Clients, One-Vendor) 
We use the term "co-sourcing" relationship to describe a many-to-one alliance where several clients contract with a single IT 
vendor for services. Such buyer alliances are common for other purchase decisions and have been the focus of research in other 
business disciplines such as marketing (i.e. co-marketing) and management (i.e. R&D consortia). Although some drawbacks exist, 
three major advantages have been identified: risk-sharing and reduction, increased bargaining power, and buyer economies of scale. 
Both the benefits and risks of co-sourcing relationships are described in the analysis section, below. 
Firms may elect to pool their needs and resources for purposes of hiring an IT vendor. This has most often been observed for new 
system development, when firms seek a common software solution or common infrastructure to support business transactions. Such 
co-sourcing alliance enables two or more firms to contract for joint delivery of IT services from a single IT vendor. Sharma & Yetton 
(1996) describe an example of several independent hospitals joining together to contract with a systems integrator to develop custom 
software. The stated objectives for collaborating on such an effort were savings in time and money for the seven hospitals 
' This does not necessarily mean that client firms were using "total outsourcing," (Earl, 1996; Lacity & Hirschheim, 1993), but that client firms were having their 
outsourcing needs met by a single vendor firm. For example, a client may be outsourcing data center management to EDS, while retaining other IS functions in- 
house. 
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participating in the a l l ian~e .~  Choudhury (1997) identified similar arrangements when firms seek a common infrastructure for 
interorganizational systems. Based on his investigation of several interorganizational systems in the aircraft industry, Choudhury 
argued that industry competitors will seek to collaboratively develop such systems, but only when the strategic importance of the 
systems are low or where the size and bargaining power of the participants are low. His arguments are supported by many examples 
in the financial services industry -- such as Cirrus and SWIFT9 (Steiner & Teixeira, 1990) -- as well as by evidence from the 
economics of technology standards (Dewan, Seidmann & Sundaresan, 1995). In principle, similar buyer alliances may also occur 
when firms contract for ongoing IT support services such as data center, LAN support and help desk, yet the evidence for such buyer 
alliances has been scant in the literature. 
Cell 4: Complex Relationships 
(Many Clients, Many Vendors) 
We use the term "complex" relationships to characterize a many-to-many relationship that features both multiple clients and 
vendors in the same outsourcing contract. This cell can be viewed as a combination of both multi-vendor and co-sourcing 
relationships. The regent contract negotiated among seven insurance companies, Andersen Consulting, and GE Capital Technology 
Management Services provides an excellent example for this type of relationship. According to Technology Partners, Inc. (1998), 
Andersen Consulting teamed with GE Capital Technology Management Services to deliver a comprehensive IT solution to the seven 
insurers", yet where both vendor firms are equal partners in the contract. According to the press release provided by Technology 
Partners, Inc.: 
Andersen Consulting will manage the overall delivery of information technology and application services and GE Capital will provide 
infrastructure services, including 21-hour-a-day data center operations; systems administration and maintenance of midframe 
environments; voice and data network management; and desktop computing and help desk support. 
Comparison of Dyadic Outsourcing Relationships to Multi-Vendor Relationships 
During the 1980s, purchasing alliances among small-to-medium sized hospitals became an effective strategy for hospitals to reduce their raw materials costs 
through economies of scale. It is not surprising, then, that the same approach would be sought for software. 
SWIFT refers to Society for Word-wide Financial Telecommunication , a long-term consortium of 1600 major banks for handling international funds transfer. 
Cirrus is a consortium of banks to allow standard ATM transactions regardless of time and the customer's location. 
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Moving horizontally across Figure 1 implies that firms seek outsourcing relationships that feature coordinated agreements with 
multiple IT vendors. As the Informationweek survey revealed, more than 90% of the outsourcing clients use multiple vendors. 
M i l e  these data do not prove that firms have established coordinated or interdependent relationships with IT vendors, based on the 
many examples described in Table 1, we argue that such arrangements are becoming widespread, and that there is value in structuring 
such coordinated relationships with multiple IT vendors, rather than a series of independent contractual agreements with distinct 
suppliers. We attribute the cause for the increased frequency of coordinated, multi-vendor relationships to several industry trends 
ranging from the emergence of new IT service vendors, sub-contracting among IT vendors (Marjanovic, 1998; Elliott, 1987), and 
client firms' greater use of selective outsourcing (Lacity et. al, 1996). Figure 2 identifies the important enabling and constraining 
forces that must be considered when moving from dyadic to multi-vendor relationships. Three enabling forces -- vendor 
specialization, contractual flexibility, and technological flexibility -- are the drivers that may trigger a client firm to choose multi- 
vendor outsourcing. 
Enabling Forces 
Vendor specialization. One reason that the multi-vendor approach has become more popular is that IT vendors form temporary or 
long-term strategic alliances with their competitors (Elliott, 1987). Such an alliance may permit vendors to focus on their core IT 
services while allowing their non-core competencies to be managed by other vendors. Such vendor specialization in this regard is 
consistent with the classical economists' notion of "division of labor" which utilizes the production economies of scale (Smith, 1965). 
As IT vendors specialize in their core activities such as data center management or networks, they are able to reduce their variable 
costs by increasing their own economics of scale. A self-reinforcing cycle occurs as vendors are able to increase their number of 
clients, enhance their skills and reputation, and drive costs further down. Such unit cost reductions also derive from vendors 
accumulated experience with the technology, as captured in the notion of "learning by doing" (Arrow, 1996). The conventional 
wisdom in classical microeconomics assumes that benefits accrued from this experience will be eventually transferred to the clients in 
the form of reduced prices. Although the production economies of scale are created by the vendors, the benefits are eventually shared 
with the clients in the long run. 
10 Cmm & Forster, Industrial Indemnity, Coregis Group, Westchester Specialty, The Resolution Group, Constitution Reinsurance, American Re Asset Management 
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Reduced Transactional Risks. A significant body of transaction cost economics literature has addressed the risks of opportunism, 
asset specificity or lock-in problems (Williamson, 1979). Intuitively, the extent to which these risks occur can be mitigated when the 
client deals with multiple vendors. More precisely, the vendors will have less incentive to behave opportunistically when other 
vendors in the alliances are ready and willing to substitute their role to replace a non-performing vendor. Conversely, single-vendor 
outsourcing relationships are constrained by huge switching costs, resulting in a greater risk that the IT vendor will behave 
opportunistically. Also, With multiple vendors, clients may benefit from the monitoring activities performed by the vendors regarding 
their peers in the contract. Although multi-vendor alliances may appear to be based on cooperation, competition always exists behind 
the scenes (Chapais, 1995). 
Technical Expertise. Clients may be attracted by the fact that a multi-vendor approach enables them to leverage "best-of-breed" 
expertise and technologies by being able to choose the best provider for each required IT function. Most vendors typically have their 
own technical specialties in some areas of IT service while lagging in other areas. This is supported by 1998 dataquest survey of 191 
IT executives (Caldwell and McGee, 1998) which has revealed that technical expertise is the most important criterion to consider 
when selecting IT vendors while vendor's understanding of business goals was the second highest factor in vendor selection. 
Constraining Forces 
While some economic benefits are realized from adopting the multi-vendor approach, there are potential drawbacks. These include 
additional coordination costs among the client and vendors and greater contractual complexity both of which may inhibit clients from 
leveraging the advantages of multi-vendor alliances. 
Coordination Costs. Coordination costs include the costs associated with information search, communication, and monitoring costs 
(Gurbaxani & Whang, 1991; Malone, Yates & Benjamin, 1988). While the first two are straightforward, monitoring costs relate to 
problems in principal-agent relationships (Banker & Kemerer, 1992). When the performance of outsourcing IT fails to meet the 
client's expectation, it is often difficult for the client to determine "whether a problem is due to negligence on the part of its supplier 
or to an unforeeable event" (Aubert, Patry & Rivard, 1998:688). This responsibility problem will be exacerbated when one vendor has 
the opportunity to point fingers at other vendors for under-performance on their past. 
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In dyadic outsourcing relationships such coordination costs are minimized, because there are only two parties involved. Such costs 
will grow -- in some cases exponentially -- as additional parties become involved in the relationship. When multi-vendor alliances do 
occur, such coordination becomes critical to the outcomes of the relationship, yet the costs to ensure coordination may be high. When 
coordination degenerates -- whether between vendor and client or among vendors -- the client's IT and business performance will 
likely suffer. Due to these complexities of multi-vendor arrangements, coordination costs favor the fewer vendors. This view is 
consistent with the "move-to-the-middle" hypothesis posed by Clemons, Reddi & Row (1993) that client firms will make greater use 
of purchasing goods and services externally (rather than through vertical integration). In addition, however, they will generally rely on 
just one or two suppliers for each good in order to minimize coordination costs (Clemons, Reddi, and Row, 1993). 
Contractual Complexity. Contracts usually become more complicated, ceteris parabis, as the number of parties increases. As the 
number of parties increases, rules and responsibilities become more complex and "incomplete" contracts occur (Williamson, 1975). 
Incomplete contracts refer to the fact that the agent usually takes into account less information than would be optimal for him to 
include in the contract. The contract literature suggests that incompleteness of contracts occurs due to the presence of "complexity 
costs" associated with writing and implementing contracts. Economic theories have shown that as the number of parties involved in 
the contract increases, legal fees incurred in writing, enforcing, and litigating such contracts will increase exponentially (Grossman 
and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990) 
In summary, there are a total of five enabling and constraining forces that client firms and IT vendors must consider when 
considering outsourcing through a multi-vendor alliance, compared to the traditional dyadic relationship. Rather than depending on a 
simple arithmetic calculation of these forces, there may be situations where one of these multiple contingencies must over-ride or 
dominate other concerns (Gresov, 1989). 
Comparison of Co-Sourcing Relationships to Dyadic Outsourcing Relationships 
Moving vertically down Figure 1 from one client to multiple clients implies that clients seek outsourcing arrangements with firms 
with needs similar to their own. As the business environment becomes more uncertain and competitive, many firms seek to gain 
economic efficiency and share business and technology risks. In IT outsourcing practice, there is a new tendency that clients have 
begun to collaborate with each other to share risk and maximize their economic efficiency. Such co-sourcing arrangements may occur 
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for a variety of different reasons, and such arrangements may differ widely in terms of the specific functions outsourced, the length of 
the relationship (short-term, medium-term or permanent), and the balance of power among members. Figure 3 provides an analysis of 
the enabling and constraining forces for such co-sourcing arrangements. 
Enabling Forces 
Three primary advantages are well understood in the strategy literature regarding the formation of joint ventures: 1) risk-sharing 
and reduction, 2) relationship power, and 3) buyer economies of scale (Berg et al., 1982; Kent, 1991). We conjecture that these 
benefits can be realized by clients in teaming with other buyers whose needs are similar. 
Risk-Sharing and Reduction. One stream of IT outsourcing research has been concerned with the risk factors that arise with any 
type of outsourcing activity. According to Aubert et al. (1998), risk factors associated with IT outsourcing can be categorized into 
three domains: 1) agent risk, 2) principal risk, and 3) transaction risk. We argue while most risk associated with agents and 
transactions are difficult for the client to control due to their exogenous nature, some of the client's potential for error due to their own 
inexperience (labeled as principal risk by Aubert et al.) can be greatly reduced by engaging in co-sourcing alliances. We believe that 
as more client firms participate in an outsourcing contract, the greater the pool of experience and the lower the chance of encountering 
this principal risk. 
Relationship Power. Several critics of IT outsourcing argue that outsourcing would lead to a loss of control of the activity or assets 
on the part of the clients (Aubert et al, 1998; Duncan,1998). Such power decreases occur when vendors assume leadership for the IT 
relationship, thus limiting client's autonomy. Pfeffer (1981) has argued that power derives from control over resource dependencies. 
Such resource dependencies can naturally occur in IT outsourcing, as vendors take control of certain decisions and resources in the 
outsourcing relationship. Pfeffer also argues that one strategy to re-assert a client's power is to form coalitions of similar buyers. 
Such coalitions and alliances can be a effective mechanisms to obtain power due to "strength in numbers". Although client firms who 
choose to outsource are necessarily ceding some control to vendors, multi-client alliances should enable the clients to re-assert their 
own power and control -- at least vis-a-vis the vendors. 
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Buyer Economies of Scale. Due to lower input costs, large-scale operations usually generate cost efficiencies. Cost savings of large- 
volume purchasing accrue to those buyers with greater market power, due to their ability to demand volume discounts from suppliers 
(Porter, 1985). It is likely that co-sourcing alliances will be able to generate client economies of scale by leveraging their market 
power." One illustration of this is that for firms presented with the option of resolving its Year 2000 problems by hiring a contractor 
independently versus doing so as part of an industry consortium, such firms may save considerable time and money by doing so as 
part of a multi-client vendor alliance, due to buyer economies of scale. 
Constraining Forces 
Even though co-sourcing alliances allow client firms to reduce the risks stemming from market transactions, these are not without 
costs. The strategic alliance literature has denoted many possible dangers associated with selecting partners, coordinating and 
implementing contracts, and managing post-alliance relationships. We suspect that all these factors may potentially inhibit clients' 
intentions to participate in co-sourcing arrangements. Among the many reasons that discourage clients to move away from any 
outsourcing alliance, we analyze three variables that are particularly relevant to the multi-clients IT outsourcing strategy: knowledge 
diffusion risk, strategic inflexibility, and client coordination costs. 
Knowledge Diffusion Risk. Many outsourcing researchers have warned that while interacting with vendors, the clients could lose 
their competitive advantages as a result of the transfer of their key business or strategic knowledge to their vendor service (Earl, 1996; 
Aubert et al, 1998). This knowledge transfer risk also exists when buyers maintain an alliance relationship with others. The 
interdependent nature of the alliance relationship forces firms to share both their physical and human resources, which consequently 
creates the environment where maintaining a secrecy is almost impossible to achieve (Harrigan and Newman, 1990). Obviously, as 
the size of the alliance increases the potential for 'leaks' and the risk of knowledge diffusion will proportionally increase. 
Strategic Inflexibility. Despite the fact that many co-sourcing alliances are project-based or short-term (Choudhury, 1997), 
participating clients' strategic flexibility may be constrained in more long-term or strategic alliances. Consider, for example, a long- 
term industry alliance to develop and maintain industry infrastructure and standards. If a single firm is already committed to 
participate in such an ongoing alliance, this might inhibit it from taking advantage of other, newer alliance opportunities. This is 
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particularly problematic when the nature of the alliance or consortium is to share common IT infrastructure. Constraints arise for two 
reasons: first, the remaining partners will likely object to the one firm's attempts to secede from the alliance, and second, after 
committing its financial resources to ongoing initiatives, the firm will find its flexibility to pursue new opportunities constrained. 
Client Coordination Costs. Coordination is a necessary ingredient for any alliance success, though not a sufficient condition. Any 
conflict or friction that occurs in the alliance, due to a lack of coordination will not generate any synergies, but rather may result in 
chaos. In principle, these coordination costs increase as the number of parties to be coordinated grows. We identified above that 
coordination costs are comprised of search, communication, and monitoring costs (Gurbaxani & Whang, 199 1). Within the context of 
co-sourcing relationships, such costs will be exacerbated due to the greater overhead of dealing with additional client partners (as 
contrasted with the prior discussion of increased vendor coordination costs). Client firms must beware of the additional coordination 
burden for identifying suitable client partners, negotiating contracts that are suitable to all parties, as well as monitoring and 
communicating among partners on an ongoing basis. 
Combining Multi-Vendor and Co-sourcing Approaches to IT Outsourcing 
Figures 2 and 3 summarized the enabling and constraining forces that occur when moving from simple dyadic relationships to 
multi-vendor or co-sourcing arrangements, respectively. The same benefits and risks occur in concert when the option of "complex" 
outsourcing relationships are considered -- here defined as combining multiple clients and multiple vendor firms into a single contract 
or alliance. Due to the complexity of the many benefits and risks that may occur, the outcomes of such complex relationships are 
difficult to predict, and are likely to be path dependent and influenced by the specific context in which they are created. The few 
examples of complex outsourcing relationships that exist are very recent ones -- such as the alliance among seven insurance firms, 
Andersen Consulting and GE Capital Technology Management Services (Technology Partners, Inc., 1998). As described earlier in 
our description of Cell 4, each outsourcing vendor serves a separate role and provides unique expertise to the client (insurance) firms. 
In terms of the actual benefits of this complex alliance, there is not yet a suitable track record to identify its outcome. We believe that 
such complex multi-vendor, multi-client outsourcing relationships will become more common in the future. The business climate 
today increasingly favors business mergers, resulting in the newly-merged firm continuing to work not only with their prior IT 
vendors, but additionally, in the need to hire new outsourcers specifically to manage the IT integration and consolidation issues 
(Linder, 1989). 
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Given the combination of enabling forces that may offer superior returns from such relationships, we believe that more such 
contracts will be announced in the hture. There may be many such deals in the negotiation process already, although given the 
number of parties involved and the potential risks to each, clearly the process for negotiating a contract suitable to all will be long. 
Furthermore, there are likely to be many more such outsourcing arrangements in place than readers can easily recognize as meeting 
our definition of complex outsourcing. This is due to the fact that, in many cases, the press release announcing an outsourcing 
agreement may mention only the largest vendor. In doing so, such press releases may slight the role of smaller or secondary IT 
vendors who are instead treated as "sub-contractors" to the primary vendor. This tendency to overlook the smaller vendors in a 
multiple vendor relationship may occur, even when the terms of the outsourcing contract specify a direct relationship between the 
smaller vendors and the clients (rather than just a contractual relationship between the small vendors and the large vendor). One by- 
product of this tendency to ignore the role of these smaller vendors is that we, as researchers, have fewer tangible, well-publicized 
examples of these complex multi-vendor multi-client relationships. 
4. Implications 
This paper has surfaced some key issues for understanding IT outsourcing. First, the examples have shown that many contextual 
forces and implementation details of the IT outsourcing arrangement are critical -- because these are the forces that have often been 
overlooked when analyzing IT outsourcing arrangements. Managers should understand that IT outsourcing arrangements differ from 
each other in critical ways. Rather than aggregating diverse types of IT outsourcing arrangements as the initial outsourcing literature 
had done (Loh & Venkatraman, 1992a), it is critical to note that outsourcing arrangements differ in terms of the type of functions 
outsourced (Grover, Cheon & Teng, 1996), their industry contexts, their business objectives, the nature of the contract (Jarillo, 1988), 
the degree of interpretation strictness of the contract (Marcolin & McLennan, 1998), and whether ownership of physical or human 
assets change hands. 
While the recent IS outsourcing research has begun to identify various ways in which outsourcing arrangements differ from each 
other, the fact is that in seeking to identify generalized predictors of outsourcing arrangements or their consequence, much of the 
literature -- particularly of the hypothesis-testing genre -- often aggregates heterogeneous situations, thus stripping these scenarios 
from their organizational history and context. 
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Implications for Managers 
It is important for both IT and line managers to realize that their options are far greater than the simple types of outsourcing 
relationships that have been prominently displayed in the literature. Recently, the simplistic type of "total outsourcing" has fallen 
under a cloud of suspicion; Strassman (1995) has even derided IT outsourcing by labeling it "a game for losers." It is critical that line 
managers recognize the variety of choices available beyond total IS outsourcing or simple dyadic relationships. By noting that other 
finns have documented their experiences with more complex outsourcing relationships, mangers may be better able to understand and 
review the specific circumstances that enable clients and vendors to engage in multi-vendor, co-sourcing, and complex relationships, 
both client and vendor managers may learn vicariously from the experiences of others. In recognizing these options, this should 
enable managers to identify the additional opportunities, risks, and management challenges before committing themselves to a course 
of action. Specifically, line managers need to consider how the various enabling and constraining forces identified in Figure 2 and 
Figure 3 may apply to their situation. They also need to learn vicariously from other in understanding the risks of these relationships, 
for example in recognizing that even in co-sourcing relationships, the other "cooperating" members may be their strongest 
competitors. 
Implications for Researchers 
We believe that understanding the incentives of multiple players involved in outsourcing relationships is a critical factor for 
optimal relationships. As the general IS literature has begun to employ more complex theories -- such as "multiple contingency" 
frameworks (Gresov, 1989; Brown, 1997) for understanding how to best organize and manage IT, so must more flexible, insightful 
frameworks be applied to understand when, what, and how to develop workable outsourcing arrangements. Similar to research that 
has been undertaken on the conditions for and experiences with strategic alliances in the R&D field, considerable insight can be 
gained from tracking firms' experiences with a range of different IT outsourcing arrangements over time (Doz, 1996; Tucci, 1998), 
rather than merely seeking generalized cause-and-effect relationships through cross-sectional survey data. One example that shows 
the need for such longitudinal methods is the recent trend where firms that had previously outsourced have canceled these outsourcing 
arrangements, re-negotiated radically different contracts (sometimes with new vendors), or have decided to "re-insource" IT 
responsibility (Hirschheim & Lacity, 1998). This is but one example of outsourcing phenomena that could easily be overlooked by 
one-time (or static) cross-sectional research. In terms of conducting ongoing research on IT outsourcing we recommend that 
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researchers incorporate strategies such as in-depth, longitudinal comparative case studies that can capture historical and contextual 
information about the firm and its industry, and also the process details of how the actual outsourcing relationships is initiated, how 
problems are surfaced and resolved, how the relationship evolves over time, and whether the contract is renewed or terminated. 
Strengths and Lirnitations 
This paper has not examined the question of whether firms should outsource or insource their IT management; similarly, it has not 
examined which IT activities firms should outsource. These are issues that the IT outsourcing literature has long sought to answer, 
although curiously, the questions posed and the insights achieved have changed dramatically over time. Such discontinuities may 
perhaps be due to changes in the IT vendor marketplace, as well as changes in management philosophy and fad regarding IT 
outsourcing (Hirschheim & Lacity, 1998; Lacity& Hirschheim, 1993). 
This paper has examined the nature of multi-party outsourcing relationships from the perspective of the outsourcing firm. Equally 
important are the same set of issues when viewed from the perspective of outsourcing vendors, yet surprisingly, this area remains little 
investigated (Gurbaxani, 1996). One possibility is that vendor firms are reluctant to discuss openly (in the academic literature or in 
trade publications) their unique strategies in collaboration with other vendors and clients or their downstream consequences. Little 
published research has attempted to provide the perspective of IT vendors regarding their insights as to how to structure outsourcing 
relationships to yield satisfied clients and vendor profits (Gurbaxani, 1996). 
Future Research 
One question for future research is how to construct a socially optimal client and vendor relationship. As the variety and 
complexity inherent in IT outsourcing relationships have increased, developing models to optimize the number of players, their 
responsibilities, and the nature of the contract becomes difficult, if not overwhelming. Nonetheless, the normative approach, based on 
game-theoretic models may generate valuable insights into reconciling conflicts and creating environments where mutual benefits are 
generated. We recommend that researchers build on existing work on game theory (Chaudhury, Nam & Rao, 1995) to better 
understand how to develop appropriate contracts. 
Another avenue for developing new theories of multi-party outsourcing relationships is the social network perspective (Nohria & 
Eccles, 1992; Gulati, 1998). This theoretic tradition could be employed to better understand the tangible and intangible benefits for 
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clients and vendors in joining such relationships. As demonstrated above, multi-vendor outsourcing relationships have recently 
become more common. It is unclear what specific explanations account for the majority of these multi-vendor relationships-- whether 
these relationships are initiated by vendors themselves (as in the Andersen ConsultingiGE Capital scenario) or at the request of the 
client (as with British Petroleum Exploration, Cross, 1995). 
Some questions that require examination are whether the outsourcing marketplace has become so competitive that it is now a 
critical strategy for vendors to initiate such alliances themselves, or whether IT vendors can still pursue solo strategies, and only 
combine forces with other vendors' (even a competitors) at the behest of its clients. Although we have provided examples of both 
scenarios, further research should be undertaken to understand the genesis and frequency of such multi-vendor relationships. Given 
the paucity of research in this area, we withhold speculation about these causes, while recommending this as an avenue for future 
research. 
W i l e  this paper presents a theoretical framework and draws anecdotally from published studies and corporate press releases 
regarding outsourcing agreements, a structured investigation of the four classes of outsourcing arrangements has not been undertaken. 
We strongly recommend this as a critical next step for fleshing out the enabling and constraining forces identified above. Such field 
research could provide validation for the enabling and constraining forces described above and may also suggest additional forces that 
we have not yet considered. 
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Taxonomy of Four Classes of Outsourcing Relationships 
One Vendor Many Vendors 
0 0 
Simple Dyadic u Multi-Vendors 
Many Clients 
Table 1 
List of Recent Multi-Vendor Alliances 
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Client Name 
Bell South 
Telecommuni- 
cations 
IRS 
DuPont 
(Chemicals) 
Ryder Systems 
Chevron 
NASA 
Department of 
Justice 
Dollar 
Value 
$5 B (est.) 
$ 8  B (est.) 
$4 B 
$ 1.4 B 
$450 M 
$ 186M 
$ lOOM 
Vendor 
Names 
EDS, Andersen 
Consulting 
CSC, IBM, , 
SAIC, Unisys, 
and Northrop 
Grumman 
CSC, 
Andersen 
Consulting 
Andersen 
Consulting 
IBM 
EDS 
GTE 
SPRINT 
KPMG 
CSC 
wang, 
SAIC 
Indus, ComTeq 
Term 
(years) 
10 years 
N.A. 
(pending) 
NA 
NA 
5 years 
15 years 
5 years 
Figure 2 
Comparison of Multi-Vendor Relationships to Dyadic Outsourcing Relationships 
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Comparison of Co-Sourcing Relationships to Dyadic Relationships 
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